متن کتاب "شلمچه"

IN THE NAME OF
ALLAH

Preface
After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Baathist Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hossein, coveted Iran’s territory. The Iranian army had been weakened due to the change in government ¸ fleeing of the some of their com-manders while others had been arrested and exe-cuted by the revolutionaries. Saddam Hossein sought an opportunity through Western and Arab countries' support to attack Iran.
In addition to the border clashes, Iraqi merce-naries distributed arms among people in southern Iran, planted bombs and blew up oil pipelines.
Saddam was also attentive to the situation in-side Iraq. In addition, considering economic status of his people, he was preparing them to fight Iran psychologically.
Immediately after the air attacks launched on September 22, Saddam, with a triumphant smile on his face, said, “We will crush the Iranians in half an hour.” He and the other leaders of the Baath party had concluded that they could over-run Iran in three days.
 Saddam had focused on Khuzestan province as the 1st goal. Occupation of this region was im-portant to the Iraqis from various viewpoints:
1- Iraq could have extended its sea borders.
2- The influence of Iraq in the Persian Gulf would considerably increase.
 3-Khuzestan was a fertile plain; In addi-tion, it enjoyed huge oil and gas reserves and could greatly increase Iraq’s clout in the oil market.
The Baathist regime was so sure that even be-fore attacking Iran, had renamed some Iranian cities to bring local people in line with their wishes. Khorramshahr was called "Mohammara", Abadan was renamed Ebbadan and Susangerd was named Khafajiyeh!!
But: what happened was quite different from their wishes …

 

 

 

 

The general region of Shalamcheh starts from the western side of Khorramshahr and ranges deep into Iraq. The borderline separates the whole region into two areas: Iran’s Shalamcheh and the Iraq’s. Iran’s Shalamcheh is located in the south-west of Khuzestan plain. It is limited to Hosseini-yeh in the north, the Arvand River south wise, Khorramshahr in the east and Iran-Iraq border west wise. Iraq’s Shalamcheh is located in the southeast of Basra. It is limited to Zeid region on the north, the Arvand River on the south, a border castle between Iran and Iraq, on the east as well as Tanumeh and al-Haretheh on the west.
Shalamcheh enjoys a tropical climate. Mini-mum temperature in winter reaches zero degrees centigrade and it surpasses 55 degrees in summer time. The region lacks natural land elevations and is made of clay earth. During rainfall, vehicles can only pass over roads. Due to the attachment of the southern side of Shalamcheh to the Arvand River, there are many marshes and related vegeta-tion.
Shalamcheh has many date orchards; they are located on the southern side, near the Arvand River. There is a paved road along the orchards’ line. It is an eastern-western road, which ends in Khorramshahr and goes inside Iraq on the west.
The Arvand River covers the whole southern side of Shalamcheh and is a turbulent river with muddy bed. Its depth varies between 5-20 m. Its length in Shalamcheh region, from the end of Bovariyan Island to Basra, amounts to 20 km.
Fish culture canal, Zoji Canal, Jasim River, and al-Duaiji Township are located in Iraq’s Sha-lamcheh region. Before the beginning of the war there were many small and large villages in Iran’s Shalamcheh, some of which were resorts of Khuzestani people due to their beautiful scenery. Villagers were mainly engaged in agriculture, livestock breeding. Major agriculture lands of Khorramshahr were located in Shalamcheh re-gion.
Since Shalamcheh was a sensitive crossing border, several border posts were in charge of protecting the region the most important ones are Shalamcheh, Moemeni and Khayyen border posts. Also several small bases and fortresses were made in certain distances for defensive pur-poses with a chief fortress playing the role of the main source for supplying forces and equipment to all other bases and fortresses.
In September 1980, due to their special condi-tions at that time, all border posts and fortresses were facing lack of needed forces and equipment. Recalls Abdolazim Nassaj, a member of revolu-tionary guards of Aghajari, said:
“Only a semi-armored unit was stationed at Shalamcheh border with a number of PMP per-sonnel carriers, which were sent to different bor-der posts. The unit was facing problems with re-gard to provistions, fuel, ammunitions and means of communications. In addition, the personnel of these had no motive to work.”
The border posts and villages of Shalamcheh were occasionally targeted by mortar fire, and clay houses were destroyed one after the other. Villagers, who were unaware of what was going on, took their cattle to Khorramshahr. The gover-nor of Khuzestan announced the Shalamcheh border closed on September 14, 1980 and was avoided non-military traffic. During the same day, artillery and anti-aircraft units of the Iraqi Army took up positions just opposite Iran’s Sha-lamcheh region. It was also announced that 20 tanks and a number of personnel carriers had been stationed facing fortress No. 3 where was only 6 km away from Shalamcheh border post. Green Berets of Navy, a number of revolutionary guards from Aghajari and a few people calling themselves Fadaeiyan-e Islam (Devotees of Is-lam), moved toward the border post to help the gendarmes.
Every night, the sound of tanks moving to transfer personnel carriers could be heard. Violent cries of Iraqi commanders and humming sound of soldiers were the harbinger of a bloody, unequal warfare.
On September 22, 1980, armored columns of Iraq’s 26th Brigade crossed the border posts and entered Shalamcheh region. At the same time, Shalamcheh border post, which was the most im-portant defensive position for the Iranian forces, was severely bombarded by Iraqi planes. The en-emy headed for Khorramshahr and intended to conquer Shalamcheh road. Hodoud, Moemeni, and Khayyen border posts, which were located at the south of Shalamcheh border post came under infense Iraqi fire.
Wireless attendants located at Shalamcheh border posts called for help from nearby for-tresses, but there was neither a response nor help-ful news. The enemy forces had conquered five fortresses and besieged the remaining fortresses.
It was still twilight when this shocking news spread at all bases: “Shalamcheh border post had collapsed.” The few defenders took up position in five-member groups at other fortresses and were doing their best to defend their positions. The chief fortress should not have fallen. It was the main target. The following recollection explains difficult conditions of those days:
“When soldiers reached the chief fortress, an officer was there with an 106-mm gun. He told them ‘If I had two tanks, I would have conquered Iraq’s Shalamcheh. Our soldiers encouraged him and attacked the Iraqis with the gendarmes help. During a severe and unequal clash, Shalamcheh border post was liberated and the Iranian forces also conquered Iraq’s Shalamcheh border post, hoisted the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran on its roof and took 20 Iraqis into captivity. Before long, however, the Iraqi forces attacked them af-ter reorganization and our men were attacked severally. Although they resisted valiantly, they could not withstand enemies’ offensive with per-sonal rifles and a single 106-mm gun so they went back to the cheif fortress.”
Now all rockets and mortar shells were aimed at Hodud border post. Abbas Bahr-ol-Olum, Reza Dashti and several other people reached the bor-der post. They ascended onto the roof to deserve the enemy movement. They could not believe what they saw: An endless column of tanks and armored personnel carriers were rapidly moving toward the city while airplanes and helicopters dominated the whole region and a massive infan-try force was moving among date palms. Abbas looked at his men. They only had several guns. The enemy was moving toward the post. An hour later, fire and smoke devoured the post.
A similar fate was awaiting the chief fortress. The few defenders fired their last bullets at the enemy before the story of the chief fortress came to its glorious end.
The 26th Armored Brigade of Iraq took posi-tion over Shalamcheh-Khorramshahr road. Sol-diers were firing in the air to show their joy of an easy victory. Tanks, one after the other, went past lifeless bodies covered in blood in defense of the Islamic homeland.
The Iraqis were approaching Pol-e No. It was the entry portal of Khorramshahr, which crossed Arayez stream. If the enemy had crossed the bridge, it would have meant conquering the city. So, the revolutionary guards of Aghajari de-stroyed the bridge to prevent the Iraqis from storming the city and the Iraqi forces passed the night behind the bridge.
However, since the bridge was not destroyed completely, before sunrise, about 200 Iraqi infan-try forces went to the other side of the bridge in several vehicles and this was exactly what 17 revolutionary guards were waiting for since many hours ago. The Iraqi truck stopped near Arayez stream and armed troops jumped out. The last soldiers were still in the truck when the revolu-tionary guards opened fired at them.
It was a pitched battle and the Iraqi forces had just realized that they were in a trap. They took up positions helped by tanks and heavy fire from across the river. About 100 Iraqis were killed in that clash and the rest gradually retreated to the other side of the bridge. Yousef Farkhideh was martyred on the Iranian side.
That story repeated the next day and the Iraqis were facing a major problem. They never thought that few people with submachine guns and rocket propelled grenades could stop them. Shalamcheh road led directly to a 40-m wide street in the cen-ter of Khorramshahr city and continued up to Karoun Bridge. The bridge was the most impor-tant goal for the enemy to facilitate the occupa-tion of the city.
On September 28, the 3rd Iraqi Armored Divi-sion established its headquarters in Shalamcheh to help their soldiers. Palm orchards of Shalam-cheh, covering the distance between the road and the Arvand River were not a good way for the Iraqi forces to penetrate.
Iranian forces; could not be supported, there were no reinforcement, no ammunition and no food. After several days of hunger they had to look for food in partly destroyed villages. They could find necessaries at local abandoned shops, but they left the money for what they took from those shops.
The enemy built up its pressure while the number of defenders of the city was reducing. Iraqi helicopters chased every one of the green berets, revolutionary guards, and people, hunting them one by one. Finally, the Iraqis reinforced themselves on October 13 and crossed Pol-e No to find a foothold at the T-junction of Shalam-cheh with Khorramshahr-Ahwaz roads. On the same day, the commander of the operational headquarters of Arvand sent a report to the 92nd Division saying:
“Today (October 13, 1980), the enemy at-tacked us at all fronts…. In Khorramshahr-Shalamcheh front, our forces withdrew leaving behind three martyrs and ten wounded….”
Azim Nassaj remembers that sad day:
“When we came out of the palm orchard, we had not reached Shalamcheh T-junction when we saw a big wilderness full of tanks. In the begin-ning, we thought they were Iranian tanks, but then we remembered that firstly, we had no tanks at the borderline and, secondly, the tanks were so numerous that the region was covered with dust….”
Now Shalamcheh had been conquered by the enemy. The road that saw peasants going over it a short time ago was now forced to bear the ordeal of tanks’ treads. Palms had lost their heads and villages, which were once a resort for the people of Khorramshahr, were now looking forward to the day when people would go back.
 
Ramezan Operation
After the fall of Khorramshahr on October 26, 1980, Shalamcheh road had become a main road for Iraqi units stationed around Khorramshahr. Some reserved brigades and divisions of the Iraqi army also set up headquarters in wilderness or palm orchards of Shalamcheh.
Eighteen months later, on April 30, 1982, when senior Iraqi commanders considered libera-tion of Shalamcheh by Iranian troops as a dream due to concrete fortifications they had built there, Beit-ol-Moqaddas operations codenamed “Ya Ali ibn Abi Talib” was launched to liberate Khorram-shahr.
At the first phase of the operations, Iranian forces liberated 35 km of Ahwaz-Khorramshahr road. Five days later and during the second phase, such areas as Jofair, Hamid garrison and Hoveizeh were cleared of Iraqi forces. The third phase of the operations, launched on May 9, was not successful due to the severe resistance put up by the enemy.
The Iranian forces were ready to make their last move in the northern side of Shalamcheh re-gion after reinforcing their equipment. During those 10 days, Iraqi commanders thought that Iran’s military strength was dwindling.
It was 22:30 on May 22 when forces of Nasr Headquarters attacked Iraqi troops stationed in Shalamcheh and after close conflict, they reached Shalamcheh road. At the same time, Fajr Head-quarters announced that its units had conquered Pol-e No and were moving toward the Arvand River.
Conquering Pol-e No would mean putting siege on thousands of Iraqi forces in Khorram-shahr. Having understood the situation, the en-emy embarked on blind counterattacks from both Khorramshahr and Shalamcheh to retake Shalam-cheh road. However, they lost their hopes due to the brave resistance put up by the Iranian troops. Iraqi commanders in the region constantly called for help, but they seldom heard a hopeful re-sponse. Floating bridges, which had been built by the Iraqis over the Arvand River to convey aid and supplies, were attacked by airplanes of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and were demol-ished. Iraq gradually reduced the force of its counterattacks and accepted the conditions. Then the Iranians closed in on Iraqi forces in Khorram-shahr. The Iraqi forces in the city also surren-dered and the city was liberated on May 24, 1982.
Although a part of Shalamcheh plain and road had been taken by the Iranians to cut off commu-nications between the Iraqi forces and their troops inside Khorramshahr, a large part was still being occupied by the Iraqis. Now, Shalamcheh was the frontline of the operations and underwent the most severe fire. The paved Shalamcheh road had been destroyed by constant artillery and mortar fires. Palm orchards were burning and the whole village was left in ruins. Even the wilderness in Shalamcheh region had been changed due to small and large embankments.
The general region to the east of Basra was always of high political and military importance in military commanders and planners'view and controlling Shalamcheh as one of the main pas-sages to Basra was always a main concern for combatant commanders. This prompted the war officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran to take a major military step not only to push the enemy to the other side of the border but also to keep it away from Khorramshahr and Abadan and station military forces of Iran behind Tigris and Arvand rivers as a main road to Basra, which would have given a suitable military and political position to the Islamic Republic of Iran. This was the first time that the Iranian forces were preparing to en-ter Iraq’s soil and Iraq’s Shalamcheh was to be the scene of the battle.
Ramezan Operation codenamed “Ya Mahdi Adrekni” was launched at 02:30 on July 13, 1982. It was launched only 50 days after retaking Khor-ramshahr from the Iraqis. It was very difficult for Iranian commanders to find out how complicated the enemy’s defensive fortifications had become during that relatively short period.
Ramezan Operation was carried out over a triangular piece of land with a total area of 1,600 sq. km. The theater was limited from north to Koushk region, from west to the Arvand River and from east to the borderline. The main objec-tive of the operation was to destroy the 3rd Iraqi corps and advancing up to the Arvand River. The enemy relied on four bridges they had built over the Arvand River in Nashveh and Tanumeh re-gions and it was predicted that destruction of the said bridges would end in the captivity of many Iraqi forces.
Everybody knew that the main battle would take place with tanks and therefore, soldiers car-rying RPGs were the focus of attention. Every RPG carrier, in addition to his own RPG, carried three rocket propelled grenades and was assisted by two or three aides, each carrying an RPG and three rockets. Commanders insisted that they should not squander their rockets and only shoot when they were sure to hit the tank.
The offensive was launched and the staunch resistance of Iraqi frontline showed that the Iraqi forces were not the same as 50 days ago. The en-emy valued every inch of Shalamcheh. In the south of Zeid border post, the Iranian soldiers penetrated as far as 30 km inside Iraq and reached the Katiban River; captured the 9th Armored Di-vision headquarters and even took the com-mander’s Benz sedan as booty. Now they were on the edge of the Fish Canal, which was quite hard to cross.
The Fish Canal was man-made and, as its name denotes that it was built to culture fish. It was 29km long and had an average width of one km. The water was 50 cm deep along the banks of the canal and was 2.5 m deep in the middle of the canal. Dikes on both sides of the canal were 1.5 m high and 10 m wide and had fashioned the ca-nal into a strong fortification, which was of high military importance to the enemy.
As soon as the Iranian forces reached the Fish Canal, they were targeted by various heavy weapons. Tanks kept up intense fire from both sides of the canal. Since other units had not pro-gressed that far, the forces reaching the canal were surrounded by the Iraqis. The grave fight between RPGs and many tanks was an epic. Tanks were so close that the Iranian combatants climbed onto them and threw grenades inside them. After destroying 85 Iraqi tanks and person-nel carriers, the siege was broken and the sur-rounded combatants reached the friendly forces.
Four days later, at 21:30, the second phase of the operation was launched with the goal of crossing the Fish Canal. Forces were moving to-ward bridges which had been built over the canal. However, armored resistance from the Iraqis pre-vented the advance of our combatants. Tanks were burning and ammunition depots were ex-ploding in every corner of the wilderness while martyred bodies were strewn here and there.
When the combatants reached bridges built over the canal, they could not advance further due to heavy fire delivered on the bridges. The sun was rising and a number of units had failed to reach the bridges. To prevent Iranian forces from being surrounded by the enemy, the commanders ordered them to retreat.
The third phase of the operation was launched on July 21 with the goal of hunting tanks to re-duce armored strength of the enemy. The fourth phase was launched in Iran’s Shalamcheh region, but was abortive due to the Iraqis’ strong resis-tance.
However, July 28, 1982, was a different day. On that day, the strongest enemy fortifications were the target of the operations. Apparently un-beatable fortifications which were the key to con-quering the region; that is, triangular embank-ments.
Those embankments were located on the northern side of the Fish Canal. Everyone of them was shaped like a big triangle. The lower side of the triangle was 2,250 m long while the two other sides were each 1,900 m long. There were three average triangles in every angle of the big trian-gle and there were three smaller triangles in every middle-sized triangle. There were three tanks in every small triangle. Therefore, every triangular embankment included 27 tanks ready to fight and were gigantic, unconquerable impediments.
Friendly forces lacked suitable armored equipment as well as anti-armor equipment and pinned all their hope on RPG rockets that they carried along.
It was 9:00 that fighting began. An armored monster rose against exemplary will of the Ira-nian combatants. From every angle of the triangu-lar embankments, heavy fire targeted the Iranian troops while blast of tank cannons had dominated the whole Shalamcheh region. The Iranian forces were climbing the sides of the embankments. The first embankment tells by the Iranian troops amidst their shouts of “Allah-o-Akbar‎” (God Is Great) on trying its top. After a few minutes the second and third embankments fell. Now it was time for establishing a long defensive embank-ment for defending the Iranian combatants by loaders. However, the embankment was shaped erroneously that the enemy forces could pene-trate. After 48 hours, the Iranian troops were forced to withdraw.
Now the scorching sun of Shalamcheh was shining on pure bodies who had carpeted the whole region in an unequal contest. The story of Ramezan Operation, the story of men fighting tanks took 15 days. During those days five Iraqi planes were hit and 1,097 tanks and personnel carriers were destroyed. Some 7,400 Iraqi forces were killed or wounded, but Shalamcheh was still occupied.
After Ramezan Operation, the Iraqi force in-undated a large part of Shalamcheh region to dis-suade further attacks by Iranian commanders. They also bolstered and reinforced their defensive fortifications and built one embankment after an-other. Those measures proved successful and made the Iranian armed forces commanders to cross out Shalamcheh from their offensive plans for four years.
 
Martyrdom T-junction
It was January 8, 1987. Senior commanders of the army and revolutionary guards as well as commanders of three headquarters which were in charge of the operation, had gathered around a big map. Everyone of them was eying one part of the map and thinking about the mission that they were supposed to carry out. Streaks of doubt were evident on their faces.
Such names as Arvand, the Fish Canal, Pen-tagonal zone, and Shalamcheh road did not evoke happy memories to their minds. Iraq had captured Iran’s Shalamcheh region for 6 years and was ready to do everything to keep it. The idea of penetrating into Shalamcheh was reminder of the bitter experiences of Ramezan Operation. In addi-tion, 4th Karbala Operation was abortive in Umm-al-Khasib region just 15 days before. Forces were moved to Shalamcheh operational theater and the enemy was most likely aware of an imminent at-tack. Gholampour, Karbala Headquarters' com-mander said:
“Everything is ready and if we do not reach a critical decision tonight, enemy airplanes will point out our intent in daylight and there’ll be a faint chance to carry out the operation later. In addition, if we order forces that have been taken here tonight to retreat we will not be able to gather them later.”
Finally, Mohsen Rezaei, the commander in chief of the revolutionary guards, said:
“Tonight is a part of the operation and cancel-ing operations is a kind of accepting defeat. Now that we are here, it is an emergency. You leave the session. Mr. Hashemi and I will make a deci-sion and inform you.”
Despite all the differences, the final order for the operations was issued in the early hours of January 9. The operational region was limited from north to south of Zeid region, from east to border fortress between Iran and Iraq, from south to the Arvand River, and from west to Zoji canal as well as Tanumeh and al-Haretheh cities.
When looking at the map, on the right there were Iranian forces and on the left way located Iraq’s frontline. The Arvand River formed the southern side of the map, which flew from left to right. Above Arvand, there were palm orchards on the banks of the river. The stretch of the north-ern side of the palm orchards into Iran reached Shalamcheh-Khorramshahr road and, on Iraq’s side, it reached pentagonal zone and the tip of the Fish Canal. The Fish Canal entered the map from northwestern side and advanced toward southeast until it reached the pentagonal zone. The upper part of the Fish Canal, which continued as far as the top of the map, was a big region which was flooded by the Iraqis.
The primary goals of the operation included conquering the Fish Canal in the north, the pen-tagonal zone in the center and Shalamcheh road in the south of the operational theater, which seemed to be very difficult. Crossing a flooded region with an area of 75 sq. km without having accurate information about the depth of water and existing impediments, penetrating many positions of the enemy at pentagonal zone and breaking strong defensive lines around Shalamcheh road were enough to make every experienced com-mander worried. (Martyr) Hossein Kharrazi, the commander of the 14th Imam Hossein Division says about how he explained the operation to his soldiers:
“We told them that nothing but a miracle could help us here. We had told our forces that this op-eration should be carried out by relying on faith and they should refer to their hearts when it comes to a choice between wisdom and heart…”
When the sun set on January 8 and darkness shrouded everywhere, there was great bustle among Iranian combatants. Brigades and divi-sions which were supposed to attack the enemy first were transferring their forces to the nearest position to the enemy to start attacks. Divers who were missioned to conquer frontline trenches of the enemy were ready to work. Personnel man-ning artillery and mortars were coordinated with scouts. Nobody knew what fate was awaiting Shalamcheh a few hours later. There were reports that the enemy had delivered heavy machine fire gun on the boats, and some Iranian soldiers were killed and several were wounded. Hours later, the official in charge of intelligence at Khatam-ol-Anbia Headquarters reported that the enemy is illuminating the region more than previous nights and Iraqi forces are moving on the road to south and west of Fish Canal. Commanders were con-cerned lest the enemy was aware of the opera-tions.

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The conflict was to start at 2:00 the next morn-ing, January 9. Our forces were supposed to start the operations when the moonlight faded away.
Midnight was approaching. Mohsen Rezaei asked an official of the headquarters to mount the embankment and report the enemy’s situation. He reported that nothing unusual could be seen on the enemy side. (Martyr) Mohammad Hassan Nazarnejad, the official in charge of the 21st Imam Reza Division operational unit says:
“That nigh, it was raining. I was concerned that if it became more severe our men would have difficulty moving…. I was very scared…. I went to Mr. Qa’ani (division commander). It asked, surprisingly, why I looked so pale? I said that I was concerned about the rain. He said perhaps it is a blessing from God. (A few moments later) I heard him whispering and asking God to help him.”
The offensive units were gradually within to get close to enemy positions. After some minutes while the region was still lit in moonlight, clashes to the south of the operational region and con-cerned everybody in the Bovariyan Islands. Yes, the Iraqis had observed a column of Iranian forces and were firing at it. Minutes later the en-emy’s effort to illuminate the region indicated that it was aware of what the Iranians were going to do. Therefore, commanders were forced to an-nounce the codename of Karbala Operation 5 at 1:35. Suddenly, Shalamcheh region was awake with cries of ‘God Is Great’ and the whole region from Bubiyan border post to Bovariyan Islands was alight.
Several minutes later, it was reported that the 41st Thar-Allah Division had reached the Fish Canal and purged the first dike and was progress-ing toward the second dike by crossing over one of the bridges which was built over the canal. The 31st Ashura Division had also entered the pen-tagonal zone and had destroyed some enemy tanks. In south of Shalamcheh, the 21st Imam Reza Division had entered the Bovariyan islands.
It was 5:00 that friendly forces had crossed the right wing of the Fish Canal and had conquered one of the triangular embankments of the Iraqi forces. At the same time, enemy forces withdrew from their positions in pentagonal zone and only a single brigade was resisting. The pentagonal zone was done. After that the main obstacle to advancement of Iranian forces was crescent em-bankments.
Crescent embankments were shaped like a semicircle with a radius of 200 m, width of 3 m and height of 5 m. There was a canal around top of the embankment and the accessory canals branching from it provided contacts between in-fantry and tank trenches. Canals were made of cements and there were roads around them to fa-cilitate the movement of tanks inside the crescent; there were minefields and barbed wire obstacles. Their crescent design made the circling around them very difficult. Anyway, conquering every crescent embankment had become an independent goal for the Iranian forces. It was at 11:15 that commander of the 10th Seyed-osh-Shohada Divi-sion announced that his forces had purged the first crescent embankment.
In the book “Seyed’s Memoirs” we read:
“There was a man called Abdolrahman Se-fidgar and was a battalion commander. He had a powerful arm and used grenades like mortars. Our guys gave boxes after boxes of grenades to him and he threw them from the 13th crescent over to the 14th crescent. The distance between the two crescents was about 100-150 meters. He emptied four or five boxes of grenades and killed many Iraqis.”
However, in the south of the operational zone, where the 21st Imam Reza Division was trying to conquer the Bovariyan Islands, operation was slow. (Martyr) Nazarnejad says:
“There was a real cemetery inside the cres-cents and behind the embankments. We had hit a great number of Iraqi PMP vehicles and tanks, but they were unending. Bodies of the dead had been amassed to make a pile. Inside the canals, which was slightly higher than the height of a grown man, was full of dead bodies up to the mouth of the canal. You had no choice but to cross them over. The bodies were inflated. Up to 2.5 meters below my feet was filled with human flesh.”
In the north of the operational theater, the 23rd al-Mahdi Division and the 18th al-Ghadir Brigade had conquered Iraq’s Bubiyan border post and were moving toward the Fish Canal. However, they were stopped in an area called, Kalleh Gavi. The 32nd Ansar-ol-Hossein Division was immedi-ately sent in to reinforce them. Kalleh Gavi was at the control of friendly forces, but it was retaken by the Iraqis a few hours later through an intense counteroffensive.
The first day had ended with units from Ira-nian forces having conquered the pentagonal zone. Other units had crossed the Fish Canal and found a foothold on the other side, but they en-countered difficulties in the southern part of the operational theater.
When the sun rose on the second day, the Iraqi army brought in 80 tanks and a large number of infantry supported by heavy artillery fire. During that day, Thar-Allah, 25th Karbala and 27th Mohammad Rasoul-ol-Lah withstood the en-emy’s counterattacks more than 21 times. In the end, the Iraqis had no choice but to withdraw. Mohsen Motlaq Gousheh recalls that day’s con-flict:
“… Hostile fire did not stop even for a single moment. About five meters ahead, the Iraqis hailed us with their grenades. We could not be-lieve that we had engaged so soon. Our guys were indifferent to the blasts caused by mortars and artillery as well as tanks, and continued to fight.
Meanwhile, Ahmadi was hit in the throat and was taken to the back of the frontline. After pass-ing through that point, where many grenades went off every moment, we