Saudi-US Relations After Iranian Attacks
TEHRAN (Defapress) - The analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reveals that the regional war with Iran, which was initiated without any consultation, coordination, or consent from Saudi Arabia, has severely challenged the traditional "security-for-alliance" formula between the United States and Riyadh, transforming Washington into both a vital partner and a significant source of risk in Saudi calculations. In fact, it was the imminent prospect of threats from Iran that had previously driven Saudi Arabia toward seeking explicit U.S. security guarantees; these guarantees were so crucial that Saudi leaders were willing to consider highly sensitive concessions, such as normalizing relations with Israel, as the price for a formal defense treaty.
However, the outbreak of the war and the U.S.'s failure to provide effective protection to Saudi Arabia during the peak of Iranian missile and drone attacks, combined with Washington's inability to restrain Israel's actions, fostered deep skepticism among Persian Gulf states. This doubt was profound enough that even before the full escalation of this war, it led to the signing of a mutual defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.
Although the Saudi Crown Prince did not secure a mutual defense treaty during his November 2025 visit to Washington, his performance was highly successful. He managed to elevate his country’s status to a Major Non-NATO Ally of the U.S., sign a new strategic defense agreement, and obtain Washington’s approval for the purchase of advanced F-35 fighter jets, all without paying the political price of normalizing relations with Israel.
Yet, even this premium status did not prevent unilateral U.S. actions; Washington launched a war without consulting Riyadh, leaving Saudi Arabia to bear the direct consequences, and as the conflict dragged on longer than expected, the U.S. prioritized protecting its own forces and equipment over meeting the urgent defense needs of its regional partners. This approach forced Riyadh to make pragmatic decisions for its immediate wartime operational needs, turning to cheaper and more accessible Ukrainian counter-drone systems.
Following the April 2026 ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, which came after Washington's evident inability to achieve regime change, Riyadh's primary concern shifted heavily toward preventing a return to hostilities, knowing that any renewed conflict would place its critical infrastructure directly within the crosshairs of Iranian missiles. This anxiety escalated to the point that when Trump unilaterally announced "Operation Freedom" in May 2026 to escort commercial vessels, Saudi Arabia revoked U.S. overflight and basing rights to avoid Iranian retaliation, restoring these permissions only after Washington abandoned the operation two days later.
Despite these tensions and the strain on relations, strategic calculations indicate that this crisis does not signal the end of U.S.-Saudi defense cooperation, as no credible alternative partner (such as China or Pakistan) can effectively alter the military balance against Iran, and the U.S. remains the only power capable of providing advanced air defense systems and real-time intelligence sharing on a massive scale.
Regarding the normalization of relations with Israel, the regional war shattered prior assumptions; Riyadh's leadership observed that close alignment with Tel Aviv (exemplified by the UAE, which deployed Israel's Iron Dome alongside Israeli personnel) actually made countries a primary target for Iranian strikes. Furthermore, if the premise that the war successfully achieved a long-term strategic weakening of Iran is correct, Saudi Arabia's incentive to pay the political price for normalization decreases significantly, as the core rationale for the alliance, countering a shared Iranian threat, is diminished.
Additionally, Israel's conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, its military operations in Lebanon and Syria, and its absolute refusal to accept a two-state solution present an insurmountable barrier to any agreement. Saudi Arabia’s official condition remains an unyielding commitment to the creation of an independent Palestinian state, a stance from which Mohammed bin Salman refused to deviate during his November 2025 Oval Office meeting with Trump, despite intense pressure.
Ultimately, unilateral Israeli military actions have caused the country to be increasingly viewed as the primary destabilizing force within Arab public opinion. While the regional war with Iran has frayed the bonds between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and highlighted the limitations of their partnership, it will not lead to a total rupture due to CENTCOM's operational requirements and Riyadh's defensive dependencies; both nations are expected to reinvest in stabilizing this cooperation once the dust of the war fully settles.
Finally, while the issue of Saudi-Israeli normalization is firmly off the agenda in the short term, regional integration and peace will only become possible in the distant future if a future Israeli government fundamentally alters its approach and supports the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
