Political Earthquake in Baghdad and Muqtada al-Sadr's Maneuver to Reengineer Power
TEHRAN (Defapress) - The recent decision by Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr regarding the "Saraya al-Salam" was issued in an atmosphere where Iraq is simultaneously facing several crises and several fundamental questions. On the one hand, the old debate about the state's monopoly on weapons has returned to the center of political conflict. On the other hand, the fledgling government of Ali Falih al-Zaidi needs a quick achievement to consolidate its authority, while at the same time, internal rifts among Shiite actors and Resistance factions have deepened. For this reason, al-Sadr's statement cannot be seen merely as an organizational or administrative decision; rather, it must be read as part of a larger transformation in Iraq's power equation; a transformation in which the boundary between the state and armed groups is being redefined, as is the relationship of political forces to the issues of resistance and national sovereignty, and al-Sadr's own position in Iraq's future competition.
Official Order for the Separation of Saraya al-Salam
Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the "National Shiite Movement," issued a formal statement ordering the dissolution, or more precisely, the separation of the movement's military wing, "Saraya al-Salam," and the full integration of its forces into the military structure of the Iraqi state. In this statement, he specified that this decision was taken in the interest of the country's public good and to prevent dangers threatening Iraq. The text of the order also stated that civilian sections affiliated with Saraya must join the "Al-Bunyan al-Marsous" organization and that henceforth they would have no right to have headquarters, weapons, uniforms, or any military insignia. Al-Sadr also thanked the Saraya al-Salam forces for their sacrifices and expressed his hope that all PMF formations would also detach themselves from partisan and sectarian dynamics and hand over their weapons to the state; an issue he said had been raised years ago.
Prime Minister's Welcome of al-Sadr's Action
Following the release of this statement, Ali Falih al-Zaidi, the Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces, welcomed Muqtada al-Sadr's decision. The Prime Minister's office issued a statement declaring that this action represents an important step towards strengthening state authority, consolidating the rule of law, and ensuring the state's monopoly on weapons. Al-Zaidi also called on other armed groups active in the Resistance sphere to follow the example of this action and operate within official state frameworks. This official welcome elevated al-Sadr's decision beyond the level of an intra-movement action and made it part of the official agenda of the Iraqi state regarding the issue of arms monopoly.
Despite the clarity of the recent statement, some observers view this development with caution because Muqtada al-Sadr had previously raised the issue of the state's monopoly on weapons in 2017 and 2019, but on those occasions, it did not lead to actual dissolution or full integration of forces. For this reason, when evaluating the recent decision, the question remains whether this time we are facing a final, executive action or a political maneuver designed more to shift the balance of power. This very history has led some analysts to consider the gap between announcing a position and its practical realization as still the most important point of ambiguity in this new field.
The Final Fate of Saraya al-Salam Forces
The main ambiguity in the current decision returns to the final fate of the Saraya al-Salam forces. It has not yet been determined whether these forces will be transferred to the Popular Mobilization Forces or integrated into structures such as the army, federal police, or counter-terrorism apparatus. This ambiguity is important because some of al-Sadr's forces have been operating within the PMF framework for years and receive salaries from the state. Therefore, the issue is not just the declaration of separation, but also the method of absorption, organization, and determination of the organizational status of these forces, which plays a decisive role in assessing the seriousness of the decision.
Field events of the past weeks and months have not been without influence on al-Sadr's decision. These include last month's clashes between Saraya al-Salam elements in the "Al-Hur" area of Karbala, which resulted in several casualties and revealed signs of internal division and reduced organizational discipline. These developments are considered important because Saraya al-Salam has always been one of the pillars of cohesion and influence for the Sadrist movement, and any sign of erosion of its internal order could serve as a warning signal for the movement's leadership. Concurrent with these events, an increase in complaints in the Samarra region regarding the behavior of some elements of this movement has also been noted in analytical texts. These complaints have challenged the "nationalist" image desired by Muqtada al-Sadr and show that the gap between the political narrative of the movement's leadership and the field performance of some forces can lead to serious vulnerability at the level of public opinion. From this perspective, the recent decision can be seen as an attempt to rebuild the same image that al-Sadr has tried to present of himself and his movement as a national and disciplined force over the past years.
Signs of Intra-Movement Purge
Al-Sadr's sudden order to collect over 1,300 military SUVs and transfer them to Najaf, along with the lack of support for a veteran figure like "Abu Deraa" following his arrest warrant, have been interpreted as signs of an attempt to restore central control. Even the leaking of the location where semi-heavy weapons were stored in Sadr City has reinforced suspicions of coordination or silence from a part of the movement's body to undermine rogue elements. The sum of these events has strengthened the impression that al-Sadr's recent order is not only directed outward from the movement but is also aimed at internal containment.
Al-Sadr's Unexpected Support for the New Prime Minister
Al-Sadr's unexpected support for the new Prime Minister, Ali Falih al-Zaidi, is seen as part of his effort to establish a balance between regional and extra-regional actors. This support comes at a time when al-Zaidi's government faces multiple pressures to consolidate its position, and any cooperation from an influential actor like Muqtada al-Sadr could alter internal dynamics. From this same perspective, the decision regarding Saraya al-Salam is not just an action at the organizational level but is part of a new arrangement that al-Sadr is trying to shape concerning the government, rivals, and the regional environment.
The Reaction of al-Nujaba: Protesting the "American Plan" of Disarmament
This decision has placed difficult questions before other resistance movements. Critics are concerned that the pressure for a "state monopoly on weapons" will target only Shiite groups, while armed structures like the "Peshmerga" in the Kurdistan Region remain outside this pressure. This concern is important because, from the perspective of these groups, talking about the state and sovereignty is only meaningful when all armed actors are subject to a single rule, not when pressure is concentrated on one side of the equation while the other side is effectively exempt.
A more fundamental question has also been raised by resistance groups: Has a commitment been obtained from the US, in exchange for handing over weapons, not to use Iraqi territory against countries in the region and to respect Iraq's territorial sovereignty? From the viewpoint of these groups, one cannot simply emphasize the dissolution of forces that emerged during the fight against ISIS while remaining silent about the military and intelligence movements of foreigners on Iraqi soil. From this perspective, the issue of weapons is not just an internal matter but is directly tied to the concept of sovereignty and Iraq's relationship with foreign powers.
Among the frank reactions, Firas al-Yasser, a member of the political council of the al-Nujaba Movement, stated in a protesting tone that it is regrettable that after two decades and enduring all kinds of wars in Iraq, the usual campaigns against the resistance are being repeated to appease Washington. He emphasized that the Iraqi government and political movements know that the disarmament project is an American plan imposed by Washington, and that the efforts of some parties to fulfill Trump's demands at the expense of Iraq's and its people's future are a shameful act. Al-Yasser also stated that decisions regarding the future of the Iraqi government and political movements must be in the hands of the Iraqi people and not under American pressure, and that any attempt to strip Iraq of its power factors could plunge the country into widespread chaos and instability.
The Two Main Poles of Conflict: Al-Sadr and Asa'ib in the Mirror of the Past
Shiite consciousness and Iraqi political mentality in general have become trapped in a reductionist dichotomy of "the disarmer and the disarmed." This dichotomy has turned into a tool for political mobilization, and each movement, by referring to the past and summoning its own historical archive, tries to use history for mutual accusations. Within this framework, the issue of weapons is no longer just a security debate but has become an arena of competition over historical, moral, and political legitimacy; an arena where each side tries to redefine the other in relation to Resistance, occupation, the state, and their own political past.
The Sadrist movement and Asa'ib have become the two main poles of the conflict; two movements that are both, more than anything else, engaged in re-examining their Resistance past and presenting it as a document for their own political and moral absolution. Supporters of the Sadrist movement accuse their rivals of seeking to hand over weapons to the US, citing the history of resistance against the American occupation to support this claim. In contrast, they highlight the performance of groups like the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Islamic Dawa Party, which were not formed within the resistance framework from the beginning and whose strategy was participation in the political process and relations with America and the West.
The Sadrist movement, in the depths of its current project, is not far from this same path and seeks to reproduce it in a new form. Although al-Sadr's current project, at the discursive level, is accompanied by the rhetoric of resistance and independence, in practice it may move towards a kind of readjustment of the relationship with the state, the political process, and even regional and international actors; a path which, according to critics, has no substantial difference from some previous models, even if it is presented differently at the symbolic and propaganda level.
Al-Sadr's Calculation: Disarming Rivals and Monopolizing Influence
Asa'ib emphasizes its history of Resistance as a permanent source of its legitimacy, but an examination of Qais al-Khazali's recent statements, particularly his interview with Dijlah TV before the recent elections, shows that this movement is gradually moving towards accepting the discourse of the state, organizing weapons, and distinguishing between different stages of resistance, i.e., before 2011 and after 2023. Therefore, the insistence of a part of Asa'ib's supporters on a discourse completely different from this development has become questionable.
Muqtada al-Sadr has insisted for years on precisely the goals he raises today and knows that disarming rivals could pave the way for him to monopolize political and popular influence. Al-Sadr simultaneously seeks to consolidate his position in Iraq's political structure and expand his relations with regional and international actors. This strategy has been described as politically very calculated because if groups hand over their weapons, they will be known in public opinion as surrendered and passive forces, and if they refuse, they will face the label of illegal, corrupt, and sectarian armed groups. In either case, al-Sadr maintains his superior moral and political position.
Al-Sadr's rivals are also gradually approaching a common view on the issue of organizing the PMF and weapons, with the difference that the main dispute is not over the principle of organization, but over the definition of "weapon" and its function. Not all weapons are the same; one type of weapon is used against America and is a tool for pressuring hegemonic projects, and another type plays a role in internal conflicts and power rivalries within the country. For America, the first type is more important, but the second type is not too problematic as long as it contributes to the continuation of internal rifts and the escalation of contradictions in Iraq.
Occupation, Independence, and the Meaning of Resistance
Is occupation merely the presence of a foreign soldier on the street? Is Iraq today an independent country where using weapons against America is considered unjustified? And if the Iraqi government cannot prevent America from using its airspace to target other countries, how can groups be expected to act as if the conflict is over? These questions show that the dispute over weapons, at its core, is also a dispute over defining Iraq's status, the limits of its independence, and the basis for the legitimacy of resistance.
Muqtada al-Sadr, with a surprising move, has once again brought the file of separating his military wing, "Saraya al-Salam," back to the scene, and today, by issuing a statement, has given only a one-week deadline to implement the order. Is this a serious decision or a political maneuver similar to 2017 and 2019, and why has al-Sadr raised this issue now? Al-Sadr used the word "infikak" (separation/detachment), not "Inhelal" (dissolution), and this difference is linguistically and politically important, because "infikak" implies a temporary organizational and administrative separation, not the elimination, dispersal, or abandonment of the forces.
Saraya al-Salam is more than an ordinary militia and is one of the most important components of the Sadrist movement's power for at least two decades; in fact, the backbone of its field and political influence. Unlike other groups, Saraya al-Salam, due to al-Sadr's organizational structure and the forces' personal loyalty to him, can be easily rebuilt, even under a new name. This very characteristic allows al-Sadr to take such an action without serious fear of losing his military capability in the long term, while simultaneously benefiting from its political and propaganda advantages.
In explaining the timing of this action, three main factors are involved: First, unprecedented American pressure on the new Iraqi government led by Ali al-Zaidi to ensure the state's monopoly on weapons and curb anti-American armed groups. Second, al-Zaidi's government needs a quick achievement to strengthen its internal and external legitimacy. Third, the big and unprecedented differences within the Shiite Coordination Framework, both over cabinet quotas and over the arms monopoly project, have made the timing ideal for al-Sadr to exploit these rifts to further weaken the Framework. From this perspective, the recent decision is simultaneously a response to external pressures and an exploitation of internal opportunities.
Scenario One: Limited Success and Propaganda Gain for al-Sadr
Saraya al-Salam would be separated, most of its forces join the security and military forces, and the process of arms monopolization for Resistance and political groups accelerates, but the resistance groups close to Iran decisively resist this process. In this situation, al-Sadr achieves a significant political and propaganda victory and can present himself as a self-sacrificing and national figure, while Iran tries to manage the crisis in a calm and controlled manner.
Scenario Two: Deepening the Rift in the Coordination Framework
In this scenario, some groups, to escape pressure or to readjust their position, may cooperate to some degree with the arms monopoly project, leading to a greater rift among Shiite forces. In such a situation, al-Sadr can benefit from the divergence of his rivals and gain more political advantage from the weakening of the Coordination Framework's cohesion without directly engaging in confrontation.
Scenario Three: Political Deadlock and Return to Maneuvering
The third scenario is a "complete deadlock"; opponents of the arms monopoly project decisively reject this path, and the possibility of practical implementation disappears. In this case, although al-Sadr can continue to emphasize his position from a propaganda perspective, to preserve his political credibility, he will be forced to resort to a new maneuver so that the gap between rhetoric and field reality does not become too apparent. This scenario, more than anything, relies on Iraq's old problem: the gap between declared political will and the possibility of its practical realization.
Scenario Four: The Risk of Military Tension and Avoidance of Internal Conflict
The fourth scenario relates to the risk of military tension; a situation where the government's attempt to forcibly advance disarmament or pressure opposing groups creates the ground for direct confrontation. This scenario is sensitive because it could lead Iraq towards internal conflict, particularly at the Shia-Shia level; various parties would avoid such a path and are unwilling to fall into the trap of an open civil war. However, the very possibility of this scenario indicates that the weapons file in Iraq still has a high potential for causing instability.
The Solution: Strengthening the State with Real Sovereignty
The right path is to strengthen the state, but not merely a state at the level of rhetoric, but a state that possesses real sovereignty, defends its borders, and does not allow its territory to become an arena for regional conflicts. In this view, the main issue is not just collecting weapons, but building a state that can acquire the necessary legitimacy and authority to make weapons outside its framework meaningless. Therefore, as long as Iraq cannot effectively exercise sovereignty over its airspace, territory, and political decisions, the dispute over weapons will not completely end.
The entirety of these developments shows that Muqtada al-Sadr's action has placed Iraq on the threshold of a new phase of power engineering; a phase where the decision of an important Shiite actor has simultaneously become a test for the government, a challenge for Resistance groups, and a tool for redefining al-Sadr's own position in the country's political scene. Whether this decision ultimately leads to genuine integration, temporary rearrangement, or merely a shift in propaganda balances is still unclear, but what is clear is that the recent order is not just about Saraya al-Salam, but about the future of the relationship between the state, weapons, legitimacy, and power in Iraq.
