Quincy Institute Warns of US Terrorist Army's Dependence on Israel
TEHRAN (Defapress) - In its latest analytical report, the American think tank Quincy has dissected the hidden clauses in the US National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2027. According to the Quincy authors, the creation of an "executive representative" with extraordinary powers in the Pentagon bypasses the US military bureaucracy and makes the country's military sector dependent on its Israeli partner in an unprecedented and irreversible way.
Based on historical examples such as Turkey's expulsion from the F-35 project, the analysis notes the high costs of integrating military supply chains and warns that this measure effectively neutralizes congressional oversight of arms aid.
The full text of the Strategic Analysis and Assessment is as follows:
The “US-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, as enacted by the House of Representatives, seeks to accelerate US-Israel defense technology cooperation, including technology sharing, joint production of weapons systems, and bilateral research and development in various areas of warfighting, including biotechnology, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and more. Notably, the Cooperation Initiative, formerly known as Section 224 and subsequently as Section 219, mandates the Secretary of Defense to designate an Executive Agent to promote integration of the US and Israeli defense industrial sectors.
Designating an Executive Agent to promote integration of industrial sectors makes this initiative significantly different from existing defense technology cooperation agreements with other allied nations. Under Department of Defense Directive 5101.01, the executive agent’s authority takes precedence over that of other Department of Defense department heads, meaning the executive agent would be able to override decisions made by other parts of the Department of Defense, such as the Defense Technology Security Office, which manages the risks posed by international transfers of defense technology and critical information.
This would make the U.S. military technologically dependent on its Israeli counterpart and make it difficult to undo the dependency if circumstances change. Analysts have also expressed concern that the initiative could further obscure U.S. military assistance to Israel by turning aid into cooperation, thereby shielding the security relationship from regular congressional votes and oversight.
So if the initiative doesn’t give the U.S. access to new technologies or add authority, what is the purpose of the initiative? The real impact of the initiative is structural. By creating the executive agent role and focusing on integrating Israeli technologies and companies into U.S. supply chains, the U.S. military structure will be transformed. The Cooperation Initiative directs the Executive Representative to coordinate joint efforts between the United States and Israel to expand and accelerate bilateral research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation in defense technology. The initiative directs internal Department of War processes toward the integration of the United States and Israel.
The title “Executive Representative” has a specific legal meaning under Department of War Directive 5101.01. The Executive Representative of the Department of War is the head of a Department of War component to whom the Secretary of War or the Assistant Secretary of War has delegated specific responsibilities, duties, and authorities to provide specified levels of support for operational missions or administrative activities or other designated activities that involve two or more Department of War components. Most importantly, within the scope of the delegated responsibilities and functions, the authority of the Legal Representative of the Department of War takes precedence over the authority of other Department of War officials performing related responsibilities and functions.
International cooperation programs are to operate through specific, accountable institutional channels, such as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Office of Defense Trade Controls, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This initiative creates a legal representative solely for cooperation programs with Israel, opening the door for this representative to be tasked with expanding integration and cooperation. This representative will be able to step in wherever there is opposition from the relevant Department of Defense offices and oversee integration regardless of opposition. The legal representative will have the authority to interpret or even change the Department of Defense’s recommendations in favor of faster and broader integration with potential Israeli partners. While State Department channels will continue to operate independently of the legal representative and are required to comply with existing laws, the legal representative will have significant influence over decisions made.
The legal representative will not be a simple coordinator. He will have almost complete authority over the entire Department of Defense bureaucracy on matters related to U.S.-Israeli defense technical cooperation. No comparable bilateral relationship with any other partner has this structure.
However, upgrading the US-Israeli relationship would be done without a treaty, without the usual consultative process that would involve integrating the national technology industrial base of the UK and Australia, and without the public debate that such a broad goal is likely to generate.
At a time when the direction of US-Israeli relations is uncertain, Israel’s actions are historically unpopular with the American public, and US and Israeli interests on important issues such as regional war with Iran diverge, it would be imprudent to embark on the kind of defence integration that has so far been reserved for treaty allies. Once the US and Israeli defence technology sectors are integrated, it will be difficult and costly to dismantle the relationship.
Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 supply chain is a good example of the costs associated with efforts to dismantle integration. When Turkey was removed from the chain in 2019 after purchasing a Russian surface-to-air missile system, it was producing about 1,000 parts in the global F-35 supply chain. Turkey’s removal from the program led to a significant increase in parts delays and ultimately a significant increase in the number of F-35 deliveries that were delayed.
American and Israeli policymakers rightly sense that a large segment of American voters is losing patience with the $3.3 billion per year in direct aid to Israel and is supporting a reassessment of the bilateral relationship. Both Congress and the executive branch must ensure that the pace and depth of U.S.-Israeli defense cooperation reflect these changes.
In the meantime, legal authorizations remain fully adequate for collaborative programs that are essential to U.S. security and where Israel brings a unique and necessary advantage. But policymakers in the U.S. government must carefully consider and discuss the supply chain and data risks in procurement processes where U.S. and Israeli interests diverge. Providing an independent sponsor to Israeli defense technology companies at the Pentagon is a poor start, and therefore, it would be wise for Congress to remove this cooperation initiative from the National Defense Authorization Act.
