Updated in: 28 February 2024 - 12:38
General Gholampour attends In Analysis the Khyber operation:

Operation Khyber defeated the enemy's will after 22 months

The commandant with a history of holy defense said: "In Khyber Agency, we were able to break the enemy's will after 22 months."
News ID: 68941
Publish Date: 02March 2018 - 01:55

Operation Khyber defeated the enemy's will after 22 monthsAccording to the Defensive and security reporter of Defapress:The Khyber operation analysis was held at the Holy Defense Certification Center in the attendance of General Ahmad Gholampour, commandant of the Holy Defense Forces and the narrators of the operation today (Wednesday, March 1).


"Our importance in the imposed war was to first announcement the occupied territories of the south of the country and to pursue and punish the aggressor," General Gholampour said in a general statement of the state of war and priorities.


He added that with the operations of Fatah al-Mubin and Beyt-Almoghadas, we were able to release 90 percent of the occupied territories. The Iraqi army's huge subdivision was destroyed, and many devastated hands fell on the hands of the Islamic warriors.


Operation Khyber, leaving impasse after 22 months


General Gholampour, cement out that after the operation of Beyt-Al moghadas, several situations changed the circumstances of the war and put our situation in a deadlock, he continued: Iraqis decided to change their strategy after the operation of Jerusalem. So when Khorramshahr was released, Iraq retreated from all the occupied territories and returned to its borders. They essentially accepted the failure, given their main aim of eliminating the system after the operation of Beyt-Al moghadas. Iraq undertook important measures in the area of weapons, equipment, manpower and information engineering, and the effects and significances of these proceedings on our front also created problems.


Referring to some differences in the army and the army during this period, and the offer of martyr Sayad Shirazi to unity of command, he said, many of the authorities at this point were worried about the collapse of this unification. The IRGC commanded that the war be lifted out of deadlock. Mohsen Rezaei gave a meeting with martyr Ali Hashemi and gave him the responsibility to review the geography of the region of Azadegan and Hora-alhoveiseh.


The commandant of the war dated stated that 30 of the Ahwaz and non-Khuzestan intelligence forces were organized. Natives and Arabs of the area were also used, the other were brief Iraqis who arrived the Hur region, so these three groups formed the headquarters of the Nusratic Circle, which in the first stage was responsible for the assessment and identification of the Hor-alazim area.


General Gholampour added: "I became the link between him and Ali Hashemi on behalf of Mohsen Rezaie. I recommended to Mohsen Reza'i to introduce him as a beneficiary to Karbala's headquarters in order to communicate more effortlessly with Ali Hashemi, retaining his position. All of Hoor's channels were detected and filmed, and a huge quantity of work was done. So, it was decided to perform operations according to the forces' talents.


The commandant of the holy war and commandant of Khyber Agency said: Before the operations were carried out and planned, in identifying operations after the departure of Hoor, all the positions of the Iraqis were identified, which was a very difficult task. Because we had a cold after the first part. Identifications were of a special form, and sometimes it took a few days, the forces in that cold should go to the small boat called Bellam, and they did the identification work.


The young forces created actions that only came from strong intelligence services


He emphasized that things were happening between children aged 18 to 22, which was similar to the work of robust intelligence services. Like forging a passport and forging the Iraqi assignment papers and even the most minor things that in turn was a strange thing. Despite the initial justification, little preparation, and lack of quarantine, how young people with a very young age have been working hard on intelligence, and today we are seeing some of the events.


General Gholampur continued: The next step was to defend other commandant s. After this, the equipment was tailored with the operation, like the use of local boats. One of our problems was the weaponry fire because of the enemy's long coldness. Even a shot could not support us. Though, the will was to carry out the operation.


The commandant of the war period stated: "On the eve of the operation, Imam made a conclusive decision and chose Hojatoleslam Hashemi as the commandant of the war, which created hopes that a person would enter the workforce at the management level and eliminate problems." Slowly.


"Regrettably, one of our shortcomings regarding the examination of the holy defense is focusing on physical achievements, General Gholampour said concerning the most significant forms of Khyber Agency operations. The design of this operation was authoritatively one of the best and most complete projections between the holy defense operations. The speed of the action was to instrument our plans from our complications and problems.


Babid will accept our weaknesses / the system did not come to Imam to support the war


He considered the lack of government support for organizations as war crimes as one of the weaknesses of the country throughout the holy defense, which controlled to the disappointment to achieve all aims during the holy defense, and explained that the regime did not come to Imam to support the war. , The Islamic parliament did not even favor a law to support the volunteers who went to war, the judiciary did not take any steps in the field of manpower source to the front, so we had many weaknesses. We must accept that our strong suit is people and we think that what we should do in the face of future threats.


General Gholampour referred to the use of the belief of surprise throughout the holy defense, adding: "We were in a state of dissimilarity with Iraq. One of the things that could have pushed us was to use the attitude of surprise. The success of the Khyber Agency is partly due to the astonishment of the forces. Although there was a possibility of influence between our Iraqi teams and Arabic-speaking Iranians, there was no such thing as it was. The next point was the geography of the region, which the enemy did not think would work at this point.


He said: "The subject of Khyber operation and other operations can be discussed and judged." Our first achievement in Khyber Agency, which was not physical, was that after 22 months we were able to break the enemy's will and operate. The next point was that notwithstanding the least physical attainment, but in terms of worth, the Khyber Islands had a depth of 50_60 km. The next point is that our military look went from land to earth and after the Badr operation our approach changed and we went to Operation Faw.

At the end of the ceremony, he was honored with several of the top writers in the history of war.


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