Persian Gulf Countries Rush to Supply Military Equipment

TEHRAN (Defapress) - Since the beginning of Iran's regional war, Ukraine has been trying to turn its combat experience into a new asset in its foreign policy. According to available information, Kyiv has sent groups of military specialists to Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to assist in intercepting Iranian drones and to provide advice on air defense. Subsequently, in March, April, and May, meetings were held between Ukrainian leaders and leaders of the Persian Gulf states, and a series of military agreements were signed with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

In some Western expert and political circles, these agreements have been interpreted as the Persian Gulf states turning away from Russia and forming a secret alliance with the West against Moscow. These interpretations, despite their deceptively pleasing appearance to Western governments, seem hasty and misleading.

The issue is not a geopolitical shift of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states against Moscow, but rather a self-interested strategy to diversify their portfolio of military allies, which the Persian Gulf states have turned to amidst the dire security situation in West Asia. This approach is a continuation of the foreign policy pattern of the Arab states since the mid-2010s: a self-interested, diverse, transactional, and timid approach. Therefore, the Persian Gulf states are not choosing Ukraine over Russia; rather, they are adding Ukraine to their set of options in the fields of security, technology, and diplomacy.

Iran's regional war has sharply highlighted the long-standing concerns of the Persian Gulf states regarding missile threats, the combat use of drones, and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. For this reason, Ukraine's military experience has become doubly attractive commercially and strategically for these countries, because Ukraine has accumulated combat experience precisely in the areas that increasingly worry the GCC states, namely cheap drones and counter-drone systems, electronic warfare, the interoperability of air defense systems, and the protection of infrastructure under conditions of prolonged missile pressure.

The recent memoranda of understanding and agreements between Ukraine and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar should be seen, first and foremost, as tools for acquiring new capabilities. Most of the currently announced agreements resemble framework cooperation and mechanisms for future contracts, technology exchange, personnel training, joint working groups, and possibly joint production. There is still no information on large purchase packages with specific volumes, delivery timelines, or financing terms. Therefore, at this stage, the political concept of these agreements outweighs their commercial content.

According to an official announcement from Kyiv, the military agreements with Saudi Arabia are documents that establish the basis for subsequent contacts, technological cooperation, and investment. This important phrase determines the framework nature of these agreements and hints at the possible composition of future contracts, but there is no news in these documents about the signing of a fully detailed commercial contract.

The agreement with the UAE also requires careful reading. Kyiv has announced that the parties have reached an agreement on cooperation in the field of security and defense, and expert teams from both sides are examining the details of future cooperation. Media reports and Ukrainian statements indicate that Kyiv has signed a 10-year defense cooperation agreement with Abu Dhabi. However, available information suggests that this is more of a framework for cooperation, and no specific contract has yet been concluded between the two countries.

Regarding Qatar, the format of the agreements is more advanced. Ukraine and Qatar have signed a 10-year intergovernmental agreement covering defense industries, air defense, counter-drone tools, personnel training, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and command and control systems. But even in the agreement between Ukraine and Qatar, the emphasis is on establishing a basic framework for investment and long-term contacts, and there is no evidence of immediate, large-scale purchases.

The difference between these two strategies is fundamental, because framework agreements and memoranda of understanding act as political tools and have no commercial value on their own. These agreements create communication channels, signal intentions, and open up opportunities for ministries and companies, but they are not in themselves evidence of a strategic shift.

It is undeniable that Ukraine has a relative, albeit exaggerated, experience in adapting to attacks by Iranian-made drones; the Persian Gulf states seek to acquire operational knowledge and technologies that Western suppliers cannot always provide with the same quality. The experience of a real, high-intensity conflict in which cheap drones, electronic warfare, layered air defense, and the rapid implementation of innovations on the battlefield played a decisive role has been instrumental in the choice of Ukraine as a new military and armaments partner.

Nevertheless, the development of military cooperation with Ukraine does not mean replacing Russia. Moscow remains a significant player in West Asia. Cooperation in energy, communication on food and fertilizer, nuclear projects, diplomatic channels, as well as cooperation in military industries, within the framework of which air defense systems, electronic warfare tools, drones, aviation equipment, and counter-drone options are provided, remains in place. Although Russian defense exports face constraints such as sanctions, production pressure, and domestic demand, Russia continues to promote weapons tested in combat conditions in foreign markets. For example, in January 2026, Rosoboronexport presented Russian drones at the UMEX exhibition in Abu Dhabi. These behaviors indicate Russia's competition with Ukraine in selling military weapons to the Persian Gulf states.

Ukraine can certainly benefit from military agreements with Arab countries, provided that those agreements turn into contracts, investment, joint production, or technology exchange. At the same time, it should be noted that Ukraine will not become an alternative security provider to Russia for the Arab countries, and especially in the foreseeable future, it lacks the necessary industrial scale to play such a role. Ukraine's ability for export-oriented mass production is very limited, and this is also a serious obstacle for Ukraine.

Therefore, the idea that Moscow cannot offer military or technological value comparable to Ukraine's competencies to the Persian Gulf states is a mistake. Ukraine has built a convincing narrative in counter-drone warfare through its experience of adapting to attacks. Russia also has experience in electronic warfare and air defense, and faces fewer restrictions than Western suppliers. The Persian Gulf states understand this very well and are unlikely to bet solely on one side.

The Arab states are carefully observing how the military equipment of these two countries performs in combat conditions, and therefore, they may have doubts about the effectiveness of some systems. Today, the Russo-Ukrainian war is the primary testing ground for unmanned systems, and the parties to this war have become the pioneers in this field. Russia and Ukraine are inevitably learning quickly from the fighting, leaving room for subsequent improvements. Kyiv's attempt to sell the narrative of successful defense against Russia to the Arab states does not align with the daily reality of Russian missiles and drones damaging Ukraine's infrastructure. Similarly, Ukrainian strikes on targets deep inside Russia raise legitimate questions about Moscow's ability to counter drones. However, the Persian Gulf states fully understand the advantages and limitations of cooperating with both countries in this field.

In a broader sense, Russia's relations with Arab states are based on mechanisms that are not easily shaken by defense cooperation with Ukraine. The Arab states self-interestedly maintain strategic uncertainty in their foreign relations. Their policy towards Russia after 2022 has consistently reflected a logic based on self-interest. At various times, they have provided humanitarian or political aid to Ukraine, hosted negotiations, maintained contact with Kyiv, and explored new security channels. However, despite Western pressure, the GCC states have largely not joined anti-Russia sanctions, have maintained political dialogue with Moscow, continued economic engagement, and expanded cooperation within the OPEC+ framework. Engagement with Russia on energy issues remains strategically valuable for Arab exporters because it ensures price stability, production management, and broader market coordination. Recent OPEC+ decisions once again show that Saudi Arabia and Russia operate within a single framework of oil-producing countries. Military agreements with Ukraine do not change this structural reality.

For this reason, Western politicians should not substitute their wishes for reality. The engagement of the Persian Gulf states with Ukraine is welcomed in Washington and European capitals, but it should not be interpreted as a sign of the GCC moving into the anti-Russian camp. For the Persian Gulf states, cooperation with Ukraine can simultaneously serve multiple purposes; gaining useful defense experience, opening investment channels, and strengthening their defensive capabilities are among the interests of the Persian Gulf states in cooperating with Ukraine. On the other hand, since 2022, the Persian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been repeatedly criticized in Washington and some European countries for maintaining self-interested relations with Moscow. Limited defense engagement with Ukraine allows them to demonstrate their political balance, reduce pressure on themselves, and create more bargaining space in their relations with Washington and Moscow. This allows them to neutralize some Western criticism without leading to a rupture in relations with Russia.

In fact, the same self-interested logic applies to their relations with Iran. The Arab states neither want to completely turn away from Iran nor remain silent about Tehran's missile and drone attacks or the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian armed forces. Their recent statements express clear dissatisfaction with attacks on the soil and infrastructure of Arab countries, but simultaneously, with mild and flattering rhetoric, they call for de-escalation, restraint, and diplomatic mediation. Therefore, the real stance of the GCC is dissatisfaction with Iran while flattering it, cooperation with the US while looking at other global powers, and cooperation with Ukraine while maintaining ties with Russia. Although such an approach may disappoint Western countries, for the Arab states, this self-interested approach equates to protecting their interests.

The reason for the Arab states' adoption of this timid strategy is their geographical vulnerability to the consequences of escalating tensions in West Asia. They are neighbors of Iran, and their economies depend on ports, energy infrastructure, tourism, aviation, transportation, finance, and investor confidence. Increased tension in the Persian Gulf harms pipelines, LNG routes, airports, desalination plants, ports, insurance costs, tourism, and investment attractiveness. An overtly anti-Iranian or anti-Russian approach by the Persian Gulf states would not make them secure; rather, it would make the GCC states more vulnerable to retaliatory actions and would eliminate their ability to de-escalate or hedge risk.

In other words, by adopting this self-interested and passive strategy, the Persian Gulf states are trying to maintain their illusory security and trying to escape any tension in the Persian Gulf region.