Birth of a Multipolar World as America Moves From “Liberal Hegemony” to “Naked Domination”

TEHRAN (Defapress) - Head of the Russian International Affairs Council, Dmitri Trenin, states: "The struggle to achieve a multipolar world" has been at the core of Russian foreign policy since the second half of the 1990s. Since then, this slogan has been constantly repeated. This is even though this struggle has, in reality, already been won. The multipolar world has been an undeniable reality for more than a decade. Its formation signifies the end of the era of the unipolar world, a time when American hegemony was not seriously challenged by anyone.

In this situation, the poles of the "New World" have taken shape:

Globally: a revived China, an independent Russia, a rapidly growing India, and possibly a recently activated Europe. Regionally: Brazil in Latin America, Iran in West Asia, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, and South Africa in Africa.

Consequently, the world is currently multipolar, and the main question now is the world's internal order. An intense struggle is underway over this issue, which in practice can be considered functionally equivalent to a world war.

Under Donald Trump, America has changed its face from a benevolent hegemon and liberal globalist to the image of a harsh master acting arbitrarily from a position of naked dominance. Washington has launched counterattacks on all fronts in an attempt to restore hegemony or at least save its slipping dominance. Simultaneously, allies like Europe, adversaries like Russia, Iran, China, and even a few "disobedient" countries like Venezuela and Cuba have become targets of American attacks.

The similarity of this struggle to world wars can be extended with these components: The First and Second World Wars in the 20th century greatly contributed to the growth of America's economic, political, and military power; the Cold War, as the realized Third World War, made America the ruler of the entire capitalist world, and the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the way for America's absolute global hegemony.

But America soon peaked at the beginning of the new millennium. Today, the "Pax Americana" is clearly in decline, and this decline is by no means peaceful.

The multipolarity of today's world is heterogeneous. In the struggle for the future order, there are two main actors: the USA and China. Washington's actions are primarily directed both at strengthening itself and at maximally weakening its main rival. The covert operations of the CIA and the Pentagon in Venezuela, America's two wars against Iran, the economic weakening of Europe, Trump's attempts to take over Greenland and cut a deal with Moscow; the ultimate goal of all of this is to deprive Beijing of access to resources and sales markets, as well as its political isolation by weakening the strategic partnership between China and Russia.

But every hostile action provokes resistance from the other side. It is hard to see America succeeding in changing the trends and pushing its rival to the margins of history, as happened with the British Empire, the German Reich, and the Soviet Union. The main advantage of Trump's foreign policy, "pessimistic frankness," destroys the deceptive yet attractive image of the "good" America. An image built at the end of World War II and cultivated for decades. Now, not only Russians, Chinese, and Iranians, but also Indians, Arabs, Europeans, Japanese, Latin Americans, and many others harbor an image of a selfish, unpredictable, and often hostile America. America's alliance system, Washington's most valuable foreign policy asset, has been shaken.

Of course, one should not go to extremes and think that America's days of global dominance are numbered. The USA still possesses enormous financial, technological, and military resources and will maintain its position as a superpower for the next few decades. Furthermore, America will not be succeeded as the global hegemon. Pax Americana will not give way to Pax Sinica. Even Beijing's surpassing of leading technologies and the creation of a comprehensive international trade system centered on China will not be sufficient for global leadership. The concept of "leadership" does not exist in China's foreign policy philosophy and practice.

Therefore, one option for the new world order could be a new US-China bipolarity. Many countries (especially in Southeast Asia) are preparing for this possibility and balancing between the two giants. They are commercially dependent on China but have close political and military ties with the USA. This middle position is inherently unstable and can hardly withstand a serious crisis in US-China relations.

Hypothetically, a new bipolarity might be reluctantly accepted in America, hoping that the new "equality" will pave the way for another American victory, similar to what happened in the US-Soviet confrontation. Its creation could also be seen in China, which typically believes in the "long game," as a satisfactory intermediate outcome. However, it is unlikely that this order would be viewed favorably by other countries, especially major powers like Russia, India, and possibly Europe.

Even if a full-fledged new bipolarity does not take shape, the US and China will remain the world's leading powers for a longer or shorter period. In this scenario, although there will not be a rigid bloc divide, spheres of attraction will form around Washington and Beijing. For powers like Russia, which defend their sovereignty and independence, this is a clear challenge.

The philosophy and tradition of Russian foreign policy lean towards the formula of a "Concert of Great Powers" as the optimal model for global governance. The "Holy Alliance" (Congress of Vienna 1814-1815), the "Big Three" meetings (1943-1945), the Yalta conferences (1945), and the "Group of Five" permanent members of the UN Security Council, who under the UN Charter bear the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, are examples of equal cooperation among major powers, including Russia, based on mutual consideration of interests.

At the current stage of development, this "Concert" model takes the form of a "Community of Civilizations." Russia has officially declared itself a "state-civilization." Russian writers consider China, India, and the USA as other existing state-civilizations in the world; other great civilizations, including Islamic, African, and Latin American civilizations, which encompass several countries, do not have a recognized representative.

In Russia's image of the world, state-civilizations interact with each other, balance each other, compete, and cooperate based on their interests and following shared values rooted in their traditions. The roles of participants in international relations are distributed: great powers assume responsibility and maintain order. Medium and small countries cooperate and benefit from the order's advantages. In principle, such a model could be fundamentally realized within the framework of a reformed United Nations, an organization that is civilizational in terms of the Security Council and has staff free from the dominance of representatives from Western countries.

Elements of the future world order are currently being implemented and tested within the framework of organizations and assemblies of countries with a global majority, established under Russia's leadership. Globally, BRICS, and on the continental level of Eurasia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are examples of such organizations.

Russia is not the largest player among the leading world powers. However, it possesses a number of the most important and even unique resources. This characteristic, in the current conditions of civilizational pluralism, allows Russia to understand its partners around the world better than others and to play not only the role of guardian of global balance but also the role of a global mediator. To gain this position and such a role in the future, Russia must be ready from now on."